T. Randolph Beard () (Department of Economics, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, USA) Roger D. Blair () (Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL 32611, USA) David L. Kaserman () (Department of Economics, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, USA) Michael L. Stern () (Department of Economics, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, USA)
Abstract
This paper focuses on third-degree price discrimination by an upstream firm with some degree of monopoly power. Downstream firms fall into two categories: efficient and inefficient, according to their relative costs of transforming a unit of the upstream good into a unit of final product. Under ordinary static conditions, price discrimination favors the inefficient firms, which have more elastic demands. We consider, however, the possibility that discrimination in the opposite direction can alter the downstream market structure toward greater efficiency. Discriminatory pricing, then, involves charging a higher price to the less efficient firms. Such pricing is shown to be both potentially profitable for the upstream firm and welfare improving as average consumer prices fall.
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Volume (Year): 76 (2009) Issue (Month): 2 (October) Pages: 500-512 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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