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Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments

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Author Info

  • James C. Cox

    ()
    (Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN), 14 Marietta Street NW, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA)

  • Elinor Ostrom,

    ()
    (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 513 North Park Avenue, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA)

  • James M. Walker

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Wylie Hall 105, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA)

  • Antonio Jamie Castillo

    ()
    (Department of Sociology, University of Granada, C/ Rector Lopez Argueta, s/n Granada, 18071, Spain)

  • Eric Coleman

    ()
    (Department of Political Science, Woodburn Hall 210, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA)

  • Robert Holahan

    ()
    (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 513 North Park Avenue, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA)

  • Michael Schoon

    ()
    (Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA)

  • Brian Steed

    ()
    (Department of Political Science, Woodburn Hall 210, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA)

Abstract

We report the results from a series of experiments designed to investigate behavior in two settings that are frequently posited in the policy literature as generating different outcomes: private property and common property. The experimental settings closely parallel earlier experimental studies of the investment or trust game. The primary research question relates to the effect of the initial allocation of property rights on the level of trust that subjects will extend to others with whom they are linked. We find that assigning the initial endowments as common property of each of N pairs of a first mover and second mover leads to marginally greater trust than when the initial endowments are fully owned by the two individual movers as their respective private property. Subjects’ decisions are also shown to be correlated with attitudes toward trust and fairness that are measured in post-experiment questionnaires.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 75 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Pages: 957-975

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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:75:4:y:2009:p:957-975

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References

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers 004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
  3. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
  4. Willinger, Marc & Keser, Claudia & Lohmann, Christopher & Usunier, Jean-Claude, 2003. "A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 447-466, August.
  5. James Cox & Daniel Friedman & Steven Gjerstad, 2004. "A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness," Experimental 0406001, EconWPA.
  6. Nava Ashraf & Iris Bohnet & Nikita Piankov, 2006. "Decomposing trust and trustworthiness," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 193-208, September.
  7. Jacobsen, Eva & Abdolkarim Sadrieh, 1996. "Experimental Proof for the Motivational Importance of Reciprocity," Discussion Paper Serie B 386, University of Bonn, Germany.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. James C. Cox & Daniel T. Hall, 2010. "Trust with Private and Common Property: Effects of Stronger Property Right Entitlements," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 1(4), pages 527-550, November.
  2. Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2011. "Is the importance of religion in daily life related to social trust? Cross-country and cross-state comparisons," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(3), pages 459-480.
  3. Berggren, Niclas & Daunfeldt, Sven-Olof & Hellström, Jörgen, 2012. "Social Trust and Central-Bank Independence," Working Paper Series 920, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  4. Ian David Soane & Rocco Scolozzi & Beatrice Marelli & Cristina Orsatti & Klaus Hubacek & Alessandro Gretter, 2011. "Developing a panarchy model of landscape conservation and management of alpine-mountain grassland in Northern Italy," Openloc Working Papers 1107, Public policies and local development.
  5. Özcan, Burcu & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2011. "Social trust and human development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 753-762.
  6. Blaine Robbins, 2012. "Institutional Quality and Generalized Trust: A Nonrecursive Causal Model," Social Indicators Research, Springer, vol. 107(2), pages 235-258, June.
  7. James C. Cox & Maroš Servátka & Radovan Vadovič, 2012. "Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission," Working Papers in Economics 12/01, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
  8. Bezabih, Mintewab & Kohlin, Gunnar & Mannberg, Andrea, 2011. "Trust, tenure insecurity, and land certification in rural Ethiopia," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 833-843.
  9. James C. Cox & Elinor Ostrom & James M. Walker, 2011. "Bosses and Kings: Asymmetric Power in Paired Common Pool and Public Good Games," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2011-06, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, revised Aug 2012.
  10. Bergh, Andreas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2013. "Trust, Welfare States and Income Equality: What Causes What?," Working Paper Series 994, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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