James C. Cox () (Experimental Economics Center (ExCEN), 14 Marietta Street NW, Georgia State University, Atlanta, GA 30303, USA) Elinor Ostrom, () (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 513 North Park Avenue, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA) James M. Walker () (Department of Economics, Wylie Hall 105, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA) Antonio Jamie Castillo () (Department of Sociology, University of Granada, C/ Rector Lopez Argueta, s/n Granada, 18071, Spain) Eric Coleman () (Department of Political Science, Woodburn Hall 210, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA) Robert Holahan () (Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 513 North Park Avenue, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA) Michael Schoon () (Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA) Brian Steed () (Department of Political Science, Woodburn Hall 210, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA)
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We report the results from a series of experiments designed to investigate behavior in two settings that are frequently posited in the policy literature as generating different outcomes: private property and common property. The experimental settings closely parallel earlier experimental studies of the investment or trust game. The primary research question relates to the effect of the initial allocation of property rights on the level of trust that subjects will extend to others with whom they are linked. We find that assigning the initial endowments as common property of each of N pairs of a first mover and second mover leads to marginally greater trust than when the initial endowments are fully owned by the two individual movers as their respective private property. Subjects’ decisions are also shown to be correlated with attitudes toward trust and fairness that are measured in post-experiment questionnaires.
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Volume (Year): 75 (2009) Issue (Month): 4 (April) Pages: 957-975 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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