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Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football

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  • Brad R. Humphreys

    ()
    (Department of Economics, 8-14 HM Tory, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada)

  • Jane E. Ruseski

    ()
    (Department of Economics, 8-14 HM Tory, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada)

Abstract

We investigate self-monitoring and enforcement of the NCAA player recruitment agreement in the context of a cartel model with incomplete information and reaction lags. Empirical results from a panel probit model strongly support the predictions of the model. Lagged winning percentage, the discount rate of the decision maker, the institution’s commitment to nonathletic activities, and the institution’s demand-cost configuration are all important predictors of institutions being placed on probation for violating the cartel rules.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 75 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
Pages: 720–735

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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:75:3:y:2009:p:720-735

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Web page: http://www.southerneconomic.org/
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Cited by:
  1. Pincin, Jared & Hoffer, Adam, 2013. "NCAA Athletic Departments: An Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Revenue and Conference Changes," MPRA Paper 49807, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Humphreys, Brad & Ruseski, Jane, 2009. "Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football," Working Papers 2009-24, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.

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