Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football

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Monitoring Cartel Behavior and Stability: Evidence from NCAA Football

Author Info

Brad R. Humphreys () (Department of Economics, 8-14 HM Tory, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada)
Jane E. Ruseski () (Department of Economics, 8-14 HM Tory, Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4, Canada)

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Abstract

We investigate self-monitoring and enforcement of the NCAA player recruitment agreement in the context of a cartel model with incomplete information and reaction lags. Empirical results from a panel probit model strongly support the predictions of the model. Lagged winning percentage, the discount rate of the decision maker, the institution’s commitment to nonathletic activities, and the institution’s demand-cost configuration are all important predictors of institutions being placed on probation for violating the cartel rules.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 75 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
Pages: 720–735
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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:75:3:y:2009:p:720-735

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
L83 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General

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Humphreys, Brad & Ruseski, Jane, 2009. "Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football," Working Papers 2009-24, University of Alberta, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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