Leading and Merging: Convex Costs, Stackelberg, and the Merger Paradox
AbstractThis paper examines the consequences of a Stackelberg leader merging with followers when costs are convex. Such mergers are always profitable for the participants, and the followers often do better merging than remaining excluded rivals. This resolution of the merger paradox cannot be generated either by Stackelberg leadership without convex costs or by convex costs without leadership. In addition, with convex costs, a merger with the leader can actually harm excluded rivals (suggesting why they might object to the merger) and increase social welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 74 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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