Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence
AbstractUsing a simple, double-blind dictator experiment, we examine the extent to which subjects' choices of distributive shares are influenced by unearned social position. We measure social position by the initial distributive shares (resources) and the subjects' ability to determine the final distributive shares (power). We find that subjects' decisions are consistent with Rawls' (1971) hypothesis that individuals expect a greater share when in a position with more power and initial resources. Finally, we test if subjects' choices under a laboratory veil of ignorance are consistent with Rawls' concept of distributive justice. “Veiled” individuals exhibit preferences that are less risk-averse and have greater variance than Rawls hypothesized.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 74 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
Other versions of this item:
- Kurtis Swope & John Cadigan & Pamela Schmitt & Robert S. Shupp, 2005. "Social Position and Distributive Justice: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers, Ball State University, Department of Economics 200505, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2005.
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
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