More Detail on the Pattern of Returns to Educational Signals
AbstractThis paper develops a multiperiod model in which workers are matched with jobs according to imperfect educational signals, and their subsequent productivities depend on both their inherent ability and on the quality of the job match. The model outlines a sequential process in which underpaid employees reveal their true productivities and overpaid employees are detected by the firm until every match is perfect. The model produces increasing returns to above median educational signals early in a worker's career—a new feature that earlier models did not capture. Estimates using data from the Current Population Survey are consistent with the theoretical result and are suggestive of a concave time pattern for the returns to educational signals.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 73 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
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