Does Crime Pay? A Classroom Demonstration of Monitoring and Enforcement
AbstractThis article presents a classroom game in which students choose whether or not to comply with pollution regulations. By varying the level of monitoring and fines for noncompliance, the game shows students how the probability and severity of enforcement affects incentives for compliance. The game can be adapted for settings other than environmental regulation and can be used in a variety of classes including regulation, law and economics, environmental economics, public economics, or economics of crime classes. It can easily be conducted in a 50-minute class period.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 72 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Other versions of this item:
- Lisa R. Anderson & Sarah L. Stafford, 2005. "Does Crime Pay? A Classroom Demonstration of Monitoring and Enforcement," Working Papers 17, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Gary S. Becker, 1968.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
- Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996.
9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
- Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
- Block, Michael K & Gerety, Vernon E, 1995. "Some Experimental Evidence on Differences between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 123-38, January.
- Anderson, Lisa R & Stafford, Sarah L, 2003. "Punishment in a Regulatory Setting: Experimental Evidence from the VCM," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 91-110, July.
- Mitchell, David & Rebelein, Robert P. & Schneider, Patricia & Simpson, Nicole B. & Eric Fisher, .
"A Classroom Experiment on Exchange Rate Determination with Purchasing Power Parity,"
Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series
87, Vassar College Department of Economics.
- David T. Mitchell & Robert P. Rebelein & Patricia H. Schneider & Nicole B. Simpson & Eric Fisher, 2009. "A Classroom Experiment on Exchange Rate Determination with Purchasing Power Parity," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(2), pages 150-165, April.
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