Rick K. Wilson () (Department of Political Science)
Abstract
This article details an experiment that is easily run in the classroom. It demonstrates how two-candidate elections quickly converge to an equilibrium. It points out that the equilibrium is centered on the median voter. Finally, it illustrates what happens when preferences or institutions change. Material associated with conducting the experiment is provided, as is supplemental material for classroom instruction.
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Volume (Year): 71 (2005) Issue (Month): 4 (April) Pages: 913-922 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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