Classroom Games: Candidate Convergence
AbstractThis article details an experiment that is easily run in the classroom. It demonstrates how two-candidate elections quickly converge to an equilibrium. It points out that the equilibrium is centered on the median voter. Finally, it illustrates what happens when preferences or institutions change. Material associated with conducting the experiment is provided, as is supplemental material for classroom instruction.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 71 (2005)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A22 - General Economics and Teaching - - Economic Education and Teaching of Economics - - - Undergraduate
- C99 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Other
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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- Michael Ensley & Scott Marchi & Michael Munger, 2007. "Candidate uncertainty, mental models, and complexity: Some experimental results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 231-246, July.
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