Unintended Consequence of Centralized Public School Funding in Michigan Education
AbstractAs part of the movement to create greater spending equity among school districts, states have centralized funding for public education and instituted funding formulas where high-spending districts are often constrained in their operational expenditures. However, these school districts often maintain local discretion over capital expenditures financed by the sale of bonds. In this study, we find that Michigan's high-spending school districts have a greater probability of issuing bonds after centralizing public school funding, indicating that debt financing of capital expenditures may have become a mechanism to allow these school districts to circumvent the policy's intent for greater spending equity.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 71 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance
- I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
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