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Endogenous Role in Mixed Markets: A Two-Production-Period Model

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  • Toshihiro Matsumura

    ()
    (Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo)

Abstract

In this paper, I investigate endogenous roles in a mixed duopoly, where private and state-owned public firms compete, by allowing two production periods. I find that many equilibria exist, including the Cournot-type equilibrium and one Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the follower. However, another Stackelberg-type equilibrium where the public firm becomes the leader does not exist. If small inventory costs are introduced, the unique equilibrium outcome becomes the Stackelberg type where the public firm is the follower.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 70 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 403-413

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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:70:2:y:2003:p:403-413

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Web page: http://www.southerneconomic.org/
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Cited by:
  1. Mukherjee, Arijit & Sinha, Uday Bhanu, 2014. "Can cost asymmetry be a rationale for privatisation?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 497-503.
  2. Rupayan Pal, 2012. "How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2012-008, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
  3. Li, Changying & Zhang, Jianhu, 2011. "Equilibrium locations in a mixed duopoly with sequential entry in real time," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 1211-1218, May.
  4. Corrado Benassi & Alessandra Chirco & Marcella Scrimitore, 2014. "Optimal manipulation rules in a mixed oligopoly," Journal of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 112(1), pages 61-84, May.
  5. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2013. "A Two-production-period Model with State-owned and Labour-managed Firms," Institutions and Economies (formerly known as International Journal of Institutions and Economies), Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya, vol. 5(1), pages 41-56, April.
  6. Matsumura, Toshihiro & Ogawa, Akira, 2014. "Inefficient but robust public leadership," MPRA Paper 56539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Balogh, Tamás L. & Tasnádi, Attila, 2011. "Does timing of decisions in a mixed duopoly matter?," MPRA Paper 30993, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2006. "Investment Decisions in a New Mixed Market," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 7(2), pages 271-281, November.

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