Rainald Borck (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) Dirk Engelmann (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) Wieland Müller (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin) Hans-Theo Normann () (Department of Economics, Royal Holloway, University of London)
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In theory, the incidence of a tax should be independent of the side of the market on which it is levied. This principle of liability-side equivalence underlies virtually all theories of tax incidence. Policy discussions, however, tend to place great emphasis on the legal division of tax payments. We use computerized experimental posted-offer markets to test liability-side equivalence. We find that market outcomes are essentially the same when the tax is levied on sellers as when it is levied on buyers. Thus, we cannot reject liability-side equivalence.
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Volume (Year): 68 (2002) Issue (Month): 3 (January) Pages: 672-682 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Rupert Sausgruber & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2009.
"Tax Salience, Voting, and Deliberation,"
NRN working papers
2009-25, The Austrian Center for Labor Economics and the Analysis of the Welfare State, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
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