Bicameral Legislatures and Fiscal Policy
AbstractEarly and modern scholars both presume that bicameral chambers limit the exploitation of minorities by the ruling majority similar to supermajority voting rules. We explain theoretically why bicameralism is a unique and desirable institution for protecting minority interests. The empirical analysis examines the structure of bicameralism in the American States. Using detailed data to proxy voter preferences, we find the degree of constituent homogeneity across chambers to be an important determinant of government expenditures for several budget components. Decreased constituent homogeneity tends to reduce redistributive spending and increase spending on public goods.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 68 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (January)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 1998.
"On the Optimal Number of Representatives,"
Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
1286, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- E. Auriol & R. Gary-Bobo, 2000. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," THEMA Working Papers 2000-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2007. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert, 2008. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Ãconomie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 86, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Caplan, Bryan & Stringham, Edward, 2005.
"Mises, Bastiat, public opinion, and public choice,"
26084, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bryan Caplan & Edward Stringham, 2005. "Mises, bastiat, public opinion, and public choice," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(1), pages 79-105.
- Stefan Voigt, 2009.
"Positive Constitutional Economics II—A Survey of Recent Developments,"
MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-UniversitÃ¤t Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)
200936, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
- Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 146(1), pages 205-256, January.
- James Rogers, 2005. "The Impact of Divided Government on Legislative Production," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 217-233, April.
- Dennis Mueller, 2005. "Constitutional political economy in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 57-73, July.
- Per Fredriksson & Daniel Millimet, 2007. "Legislative Organization and Pollution Taxation," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 217-242, April.
- John Bradbury & Joseph Johnson, 2006. "Do supermajority rules limit or enhance majority tyranny? evidence from the US States, 1960–1997," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 429-441, June.
- John Bradbury & W. Crain, 2005. "Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 385-407, December.
- Roberto Ricciuti, 2010.
"Legislatures and Government Spending: Evidence from Democratic Countries,"
The IUP Journal of Governance and Public Policy, IUP Publications,
IUP Publications, vol. 0(1 & 2), pages 41-58, March & J.
- Roberto Ricciuti, 2004. "Legislatures and government spending: evidence from democratic countries," ICER Working Papers, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research 20-2004, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.
- Ross Hickey, 2013. "Bicameral bargaining and federation formation," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 217-241, March.
- Casper Hunnerup Dahl, 2014. "Parties and institutions: empirical evidence on veto players and the growth of government," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 415-433, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laura Razzolini).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.