Injury-Based Protection with Auditing under Imperfect Information
AbstractWe analyze optimal protection when a benevolent government must maintain nonnegative domestic profits and when the domestic import-competing firm has private information about its costs. A costly audit mechanism can deter strategic manipulation of this private information. We show that a high penalty/low probability of investigation is optimal when the shadow price of the firm profit is low compared with the audit cost. A low penalty/high probability of investigation is optimal when there is a low investigation cost and a high shadow price of firm profit. In this latter case, the trade authority obtains truthful announcements by directly auditing the firm.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 68 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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