Right-to-Work Laws: New Evidence from the Stock Market
AbstractThis article is an empirical examination of whether or not stockholder wealth rises in response to passage of a right-to-work law—a state law banning union security clauses from collective bargaining agreements. Stockholder wealth rose when Louisiana passed such a law in 1976 and when Idaho did so in 1985–1986. Presumably this occurred because investors anticipated higher future profits with weaker labor unions or a lower probability of future organization. This is new evidence that such laws are more than symbolic: They hamper labor unions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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- Emin M. Dinlersoz & Rubén Hernández-Murillo, 2002. "Did "right-to-work" work for Idaho?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 29-42.
- Addison, John T., 2006. "Politico-Economic Causes of Labor Regulation in the United States: Rent Seeking, Alliances, Raising Rivals' Costs (Even Lowering One's Own?), and Interjurisdictional Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 2381, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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