Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Choosing Winners and Losers in a Classroom Permit Trading Game

Contents:

Author Info

  • Lisa R. Anderson
  • Sarah L. Stafford

Abstract

This paper presents a classroom game in which students trade pollution permits. By changing the distribution of permits across firms, the game shows students how the allocation of property rights determines the winners and losers in the permit trading system but does not affect the efficiency of the system. This game can be used in a variety of classes, including principles or environmental economics, and can be conducted in a 50-minute class period with follow-up discussion in the next class.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 67 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 212-219

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:67:1:y:2000:p:212-219

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.southerneconomic.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Charles A. Holt, 1996. "Classroom Games: Trading in a Pit Market," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 193-203, Winter.
  2. Plott, Charles R, 1983. "Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369), pages 106-27, March.
  3. Cason, T.N. & Gangadharan, L., 1997. "An Experimental Study of Electronic Bulletin Board Trading for Emission Permits," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 592, The University of Melbourne.
  4. Nugent, Rachel A, 1997. "Teaching Tools: A Pollution Rights Trading Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(3), pages 679-85, July.
  5. Stuart Mestelman & Andrew Muller, 1997. "What Have We Learned From Emissions Trading Experiments?," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications, McMaster University 1997-03, McMaster University.
  6. Cason, Timothy N. & Plott, Charles R., 1996. "EPA's New Emissions Trading Mechanism: A Laboratory Evaluation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 133-160, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Charles Holt & Erica Myers & Markus Wrake & Dallas Burtraw & Svante Mandell, 2010. "Teaching Opportunity Cost in an Emissions Permit Experiment," International Review of Economic Education, Economics Network, University of Bristol, Economics Network, University of Bristol, vol. 9(2), pages 34-42.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:67:1:y:2000:p:212-219. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Laura Razzolini).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.