Welfare Policy: Cash Versus Kind, Self-Selection and Notches
AbstractThis paper investigates second-best allocations where the government lacks full information about consumer types, and how such allocations may be implemented through notch schemes. Thus, we provide another rationale for notches in addition to that investigated by Blinder and Rosen (1985). We use a model of Blackorby and Donaldson (1988), extending their results to more general preferences and to more general tax-subsidy instruments (piecewise linear, rather than linear). We argue that observed policies are sometimes of this nature: In-kind subsidies that are available only if consumption equals or exceeds a particular amount have been used in practice, in housing, and medical care.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 66 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (April)
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- Tim Callan & Claire Keane, 2008.
"Non-Cash Benefits and the Distribution of Economic Welfare,"
WP245, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
- Callan, Tim & Keane, Claire, 2009. "Non-cash Benefits and the Distribution of Economic Welfare," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 40(1), pages 49-71.
- Callan, Tim & Keane, Claire, 2009. "Non-Cash Benefits and the Distribution of Economic Welfare," IZA Discussion Papers 3954, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Nirvikar Singh, 2004. "The Impact of International Labor Standards: A Survey of Economic Theory," International Trade 0412007, EconWPA.
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