Exclusive versus Common Dealership
AbstractIn a setting with two differentiated producers and identical retailers, we analyzed whether the producers will have a distribution system with one or several retailers. In contrast to the existing literature, we allow for full foreclosure under both types of distribution systems. We find, in contrast to what has been shown in the received literature, that the producers will prefer a distribution system with a single common retailer to a system with separate exclusive dealers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 66 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Other versions of this item:
- Gabrielsen, T. & Sorgard, L., 1999. "Exclusive Versus Common Dealership," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 200, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
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- Staahl Gabrielsen, T. & Sorgard, L., 2000.
"Private Labels, Price Rivalry, and Public Policy,"
8/00, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl & SÃ¸rgard, Lars, 2000. "Private Labels, Price Rivalry, and Public Policy," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8wh900ks, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
- Igor Muraviev, 2007. "Equilibrium Configurations of Distribution Channels in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries," Working Papers hal-00243078, HAL.
- Rafael MONER-COLONQUES & José J. SEMPERE-MONERRIS & Amparo URBANO, 2002. "The Manufacturers’ Choice of Brand Policy under Successive Duopoly," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2002003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
- José J. Sempere Monerris & Rafael Moner Colonques & Amparo Urbano, 2001. "Equilibrium Distribution Systems Under Retailers' Strategic Behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Wang, Hao, 2004. "Resale price maintenance in an oligopoly with uncertain demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 389-411, March.
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