Delaying Inter Vivos Transmissions Under Asymmetric Information

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Delaying Inter Vivos Transmissions Under Asymmetric Information

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H. Cremer
P. Pestieau

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Helmuth Cremer

Abstract

This paper develops a model of bequeathing based on a moral hazard type of argument. This model explains why altruistic parents prefer late bequests to early inter-vivos gifts; it also analyzes whether or not they ought to leave rather equal bequests to their children even when the children end up with quite different incomes.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
Pages: 322-330
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Handle: RePEc:sej:ancoec:v:65:2:y:1998:p:322-330

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Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children To Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms And Social Insurance," Seminar Papers 691, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, A. & Nyberg, S., 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 557, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Research Papers in Economics 2001:5, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten, 2001. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance," Working Paper Series 557, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg, 2006. "Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms, and Social Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1473-1503, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ralph Chami & Samir Jahjah & Connel Fullenkamp, 2003. "Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development," IMF Working Papers 03/189, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
Jellal, Mohamed, 2009. "Family Capitalism Corporate Governance Theory," MPRA Paper 17886, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]

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