The Leverage Theory of Tying Revisited: Evidence from Newspaper Advertising
AbstractData from the Canadian newspaper-advertising industry is used to assess the private profitability of tying in a market where the standard efficiency motives (e.g., price discrimination, cost saving, and quality control) are unlikely to apply. The empirical assessment is based on a model of leveraging in which suppliers of the tied good are paid a commission rather than a fee for service. This model demonstrates that tying is profitable under a wide range of circumstances. Furthermore, it is found that, with newspapers, tying and monopoly power go hand in hand.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Economic Association in its journal Southern Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 65 (1998)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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