Managerial Versus Entrepreneurial Firms: The Benefits Of Separating Ownership And Control
AbstractAgency theory emphasizes that separating ownership and control can lead to inefficiencies in corporations, but the literature on strategic delegation points out that the owner will profit from this separation due to advantages from self-commitment. In this paper, both literatures are combined. The results show that strategic delegation can be even more profitable in the presence of agency problems. Furthermore, delegating takeover decisions to managers yields positive welfare effects.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by LMU Munich School of Management in its journal Schmalenbach Business Review.
Volume (Year): 56 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Agency Theory; Strategic Delegation; Takeovers.;
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- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
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