The Impact Of Executive Compensation On The Post-Merger Integration Of U.S. And German Firms
AbstractBased on research in management compensation and on the theory of international diversification, this paper analyzes the impact of executive compensation on the success of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) between U.S. and German firms. The results show that differences in the level and structure of U.S. and German executive compensation packages impair incentives, monitoring efforts, and management’s willingness to innovate. Cooperation across national boundaries, a collective goal orientation, and the accumulation of social capital are hindered. Depending on the type of diversification, the joint firm faces a trade-off between the realization of synergies in related businesses and increasing conflicts among managers with distinct compensation packages.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by LMU Munich School of Management in its journal Schmalenbach Business Review.
Volume (Year): 55 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (sbr).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.