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The Affections and the Passions

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  • JACK HIRSHLEIFER

    (University of California, Los Angeles)

Abstract

Two types of emotions can be distinguished: the affections (stable patterns of malevolence or benevolence toward particular others) and the passions (action-dependent responses to friendly/unfriendly acts). Either type may serve to induce cooperation from a self-interested party, subject to several limitations. Shakespeare's King Lear is examined as an instance where benevolence fails to elicit cooperation. To meet the necessary condition for evolutionary survival in competition with rational self-interested players, the emotional party must benefit not only in “feel good†utility terms but in actual material payoff. SILVER RULE, as an instance of reactive passionate behavior related to the familiar TIT FOR TAT behavior, is shown to lose out in evolutionary competition against RATIONAL play unless the SILVER RULE player has a sufficiently high probability of being able to detect when his opponent is a selfish RATIONAL player.

Suggested Citation

  • Jack Hirshleifer, 1993. "The Affections and the Passions," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(2), pages 185-202, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:5:y:1993:i:2:p:185-202
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463193005002004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. Jack Hirshleifer & Juan Carlos Martinez Coll, 1988. "What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of Cooperation?," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(2), pages 367-398, June.
    3. Huang, Peter H. & Wu, Ho-Mou, 1992. "Emotional responses in litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 31-44, March.
    4. Juan Carlos Martinez Coll & Jack Hirshleifer, 1991. "The Limits of Reciprocity," Rationality and Society, , vol. 3(1), pages 35-64, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bradford Cornell, 1995. "A Hypothesis Regarding the Origins of Ethnic Discrimination," Rationality and Society, , vol. 7(1), pages 4-30, January.
    2. Nicolò Bellanca & Giancarlo Pichillo, 2014. "Identitarian passions: the overwhelming power of the human recognition need," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(1), pages 13-38, April.
    3. Thomas Wagner, 1998. "Reciprocity And Efficiency," Rationality and Society, , vol. 10(3), pages 347-375, August.
    4. Shepherd, Dean A., 2009. "Grief recovery from the loss of a family business: A multi- and meso-level theory," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 81-97, January.
    5. Konow, James, 1996. "A positive theory of economic fairness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 13-35, October.
    6. Jack Hirshleifer, 2000. "Game-Theoretic Interpretations of Commitment," UCLA Economics Working Papers 799, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Kazuo Yamaguchi, 2006. "Rationality of Tolerance," Rationality and Society, , vol. 18(3), pages 275-303, August.
    8. Nicolò Bellanca, 2014. "Vulnerabili e appassionati. Sui fondamenti antropologici della scienza economica," Working Papers - Economics wp2014_05.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    9. Hausken, Kjell, 2006. "Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 251-276, June.
    10. Jeannette Brosig & Joachim Weimann & Chun-Lei Yang, 2003. "The Hot Versus Cold Effect in a Simple Bargaining Experiment," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 6(1), pages 75-90, June.

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