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The Dynamics of Contracts and Generalized Trustworthiness

Author

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  • Brent Simpson

    (Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA, bts@sc.edu)

  • Kimmo Eriksson

    (Department of Mathematics and Physics, Mälardalen University, SE-721 23, Västerås, Sweden, kimmo.eriksson@mdh.se)

Abstract

Generalized trust, or trust in strangers, has been traced to a wide range of societal benefits. But generalized trust is not sustainable in the absence of widespread generalized trustworthiness, that is, the tendency for strangers to honor trust extended to them. While there has been much work on the origins and consequences of generalized trust, surprisingly little research has addressed the antecedents of generalized trustworthiness. We argue that generalized trustworthiness is negatively affected by prior exposure to a ubiquitous extrinsic motivator of trustworthy behavior, contracts. Specifically, drawing on classic social psychological research on the overjustification effect, we argue that actors previously constrained by contracts will attribute their own `trustworthy' behavior in those interactions to the contract itself. According to overjustification arguments, this misattribution should lead to a decrease in intrinsic motivations to act trust-worthily in interactions where the actor is not constrained by the contract. Results of a new experiment support this argument.

Suggested Citation

  • Brent Simpson & Kimmo Eriksson, 2009. "The Dynamics of Contracts and Generalized Trustworthiness," Rationality and Society, , vol. 21(1), pages 59-80, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:59-80
    DOI: 10.1177/1043463108099348
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Christan Bjørnskov & Miguel Ángel Borrella‐Mas & Martin Rode, 2022. "The economics of change and stability in social trust: Evidence from (and for) Catalan secession," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 275-297, July.
    2. Christian Bjørnskov, 2010. "How does social trust lead to better governance? An attempt to separate electoral and bureaucratic mechanisms," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 323-346, July.
    3. Blaine G. Robbins, 2011. "Neither government nor community alone: A test of state-centered models of generalized trust," Rationality and Society, , vol. 23(3), pages 304-346, August.
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    6. van den Akker, Olmo R. & van Assen, Marcel A.L.M. & van Vugt, Mark & Wicherts, Jelte M., 2020. "Sex differences in trust and trustworthiness: A meta-analysis of the trust game and the gift-exchange game," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

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