Fiscal Institutions and the Relation between Central and Sub-National Government Fiscal Balances
AbstractSkeptics of fiscal decentralization argue that it can complicate fiscal stabilization policies at the level of the central government because of uncoordinated fiscal actions by the national and sub-national tiers of government. However, panel data estimates for Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development economies suggest that this danger has been overstated in that changes in the fiscal balances of central and sub-national governments are highly positively correlated. This result partly reflects the success of institutional arrangements that govern intergovernmental fiscal relations and appears unrelated to the extent of fiscal decentralization.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance Review.
Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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- Thushyanthan Baskaran, 2012.
"Tax Decentralization and Public Deficits in OECD Countries,"
Publius: The Journal of Federalism,
Oxford University Press, vol. 42(4), pages 688-707, October.
- Baskaran, Thushyanthan, 2011. "Tax decentralization and public deficits in OECD countries," MPRA Paper 35141, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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