Tax Evasion and Tax Progressivity
AbstractIn a pure tax evasion framework in which the monetary penalty is a function of the evaded tax, more progressive income taxes will reduce tax evasion if income has to be declared. However, if tax payments have to be declared, higher tax progressivity will have no effects. Thus, the relationship between tax evasion and tax progressivity depends on whether income or taxes have to be divulged to tax authorities. If the fine is a function of undeclared income, higher tax progressivity will always raise evasion.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Public Finance Review.
Volume (Year): 31 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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- Laszlo Goerke, 2013.
"Relative Consumption and Tax Evasion,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4077, CESifo Group Munich.
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- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2004:i:5:p:1-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Laszlo Goerke, 2014. "Income Tax Buyouts and Income Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 4613, CESifo Group Munich.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2014. "Income Tax Buyouts and Income Tax Evasion," IAAEU Discussion Papers 201401, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
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