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Rent Seeking and Fixed-Share Pools in Government

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  • Roger L. Faith

    (Arizona State University)

Abstract

A fixed-share pool is a given amount of resources to be divided among a given number of claimants in which a claimant’s share of the pool is fixed exogenously. Consequently, rent seeking to increase one’s share of the pool is effectively eliminated. However, if claimants have sharing rights to more than one pool, rent seeking in the form of transferring resources from a pool where one has a small share to a pool where one has a large share will generally occur. A game-theoretic analysis of this type of rent seeking is discussed and then applied to a number of governmental settings.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger L. Faith, 2002. "Rent Seeking and Fixed-Share Pools in Government," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(5), pages 442-455, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:30:y:2002:i:5:p:442-455
    DOI: 10.1177/109114210203000507
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    2. Buchanan, James M, 1983. "Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 71-85, April.
    3. Roger Faith & Robert Tollison, "undated". "Inheritance, Equal Division and Rent Seeking," Working Papers 2133341, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
    4. James M. Buchanan, 1963. "The Economics of Earmarked Taxes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 457-457.
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