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Constituency Size and Government Spending

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Thornton

    (Columbus State University)

  • Marc Ulrich

    (Auburn University)

Abstract

In the economic model of government, the size of the legislature is a variable whose effect on government spending is not predictable a priori. The authors show that an alternative measure, constituency size, defined as the number of constituents per legislator, is positively related to state government spending. This suggests that increases in constituency size over time may account for the increase in the size of government. The size of the legislature could be manipulated to control constituency size and thereby provide an effective check on government spending.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Thornton & Marc Ulrich, 1999. "Constituency Size and Government Spending," Public Finance Review, , vol. 27(6), pages 588-598, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:27:y:1999:i:6:p:588-598
    DOI: 10.1177/109114219902700602
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
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    4. Crain, W Mark & Deaton, Thomas H & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 15(2), pages 298-302, April.
    5. W. Crain & Robert Tollison & Brian Goff & Diek Carlson, 1985. "Legislator specialization and the size of government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 311-315, January.
    6. Jackson, John D & Saurman, David S & Shughart, William F, II, 1994. "Instant Winners: Legal Change in Transition and the Diffusion of State Lotteries," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(3-4), pages 245-263, September.
    7. Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Germà Bel & Ringa Raudla & Miguel Rodrigues & António F. Tavares, 2018. "These rules are made for spending: testing and extending the law of 1/n," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(1), pages 41-60, January.
    2. Nadia Fiorino & Roberto Ricciuti, 2005. "Legislature and Constituency Size in Italian Regions: Forecasting the Effects of a Reform," Department of Economics University of Siena 448, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    3. Eicher, Theo S. & García-Peñalosa, Cecilia & Kuenzel, David J., 2018. "Constitutional rules as determinants of social infrastructure," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 182-209.
    4. Nadia Fiorino & Roberto Ricciuti, 2008. "Interest Groups, Government Spending and Italian Industrial Growth (1876-1913)," RSCAS Working Papers 2008/08, European University Institute.

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