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A Survey of Player-based and Link-based Allocation Rules for Network Games

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  • Surajit Borkotokey
  • Loyimee Gogoi
  • Sudipta Sarangi

Abstract

In this survey, we present recent developments in the literature on Network games. We briefly cover the literature on Communication situations and the corresponding allocation rules. This is followed by a review on the existing player- and link-based fixed and flexible allocation rules for networks. It is worth mentioning that all the allocation rules hitherto found in the literature are either player- or link-based which means that they give emphasis either on the players or on the links they form, but not both equally.

Suggested Citation

  • Surajit Borkotokey & Loyimee Gogoi & Sudipta Sarangi, 2014. "A Survey of Player-based and Link-based Allocation Rules for Network Games," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 2(1), pages 5-26, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:miceco:v:2:y:2014:i:1:p:5-26
    DOI: 10.1177/2321022214522744
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pramod C. Mane & Nagarajan Krishnamurthy & Kapil Ahuja, 2019. "Formation of Stable and Efficient Social Storage Cloud," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-17, November.
    2. Surajit Borkotokey & Sujata Goala & Niharika Kakoty & Parishmita Boruah, 2022. "The component-wise egalitarian Myerson value for Network Games," Papers 2201.02793, arXiv.org.
    3. Pramod C. Mane & Kapil Ahuja & Nagarajan Krishnamurthy, 2020. "Stability, efficiency, and contentedness of social storage networks," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 287(2), pages 811-842, April.
    4. Nizar Allouch & Luis A.Guardiola & A. Meca, "undated". "Measuring productivity in networks: A game-theoretic approach," Studies in Economics 2302, School of Economics, University of Kent.

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