IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v5y1993i3p317-348.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Doing Well While Intending Good: Cases in Political Exploitation

Author

Listed:
  • William C. Mitchell
  • Michael C. Munger

Abstract

Exploitation has a deservedly bad reputation as an analytic concept in the social sciences. But this need not be so; a simple definition of exploitation is advanced that has a positive basis. Exploitation should be defined as the result of rent-seeking activity that results in social outcomes that are not Paretooptimal. Government, or the organization with a constitutional monopoly on the legitimate use of force, is ideally charged with balancing two competing kinds of exploitation. The first is the private exploitation of agents acting in unregulated markets where property rights are undefined and unenforced. The second is political exploitation using the powers of government itself. The ideal task of government is to minimize the total exploitative activity in the polity. Five case studies are offered as illustrations of political exploitation, and how difficult the task of balancing is.

Suggested Citation

  • William C. Mitchell & Michael C. Munger, 1993. "Doing Well While Intending Good: Cases in Political Exploitation," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 5(3), pages 317-348, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:317-348
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692893005003002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951692893005003002
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951692893005003002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wayne Brough & Mwangi Kimenyi, 1986. "On the inefficient extraction of rents by dictators," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 37-48, January.
    2. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812.
    3. Steindl, Frank G, 1990. "University Admission Requirements as Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 273-279, June.
    4. Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 807-827, August.
    5. Dougan, William R, 1991. "The Cost of Rent Seeking: Is GNP Negative?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(3), pages 660-664, June.
    6. Krueger, Anne O, 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 291-303, June.
    7. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    8. Douglass C. North, 1990. "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(4), pages 355-367, October.
    9. Pashigian, B Peter, 1985. "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-interests Are Being Protected?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(4), pages 551-584, October.
    10. Gelb, A & Knight, John B & Sabot, R H, 1991. "Public Sector Employment, Rent Seeking and Economic Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1186-1199, September.
    11. Baumol, William J, 1974. "The Transformation of Values: What Marx "Really" Meant (An Interpretation)," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 51-62, March.
    12. repec:ucp:bkecon:9780226253268 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Enelow,James M. & Hinich,Melvin J., 1984. "The Spatial Theory of Voting," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521275156.
    14. Bruce Gardner, 1983. "Efficient Redistribution through Commodity Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-234.
    15. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922.
    16. Buchanan, James M & Lee, Dwight R, 1982. "Politics, Time, and the Laffer Curve," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 816-819, August.
    17. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    18. Melvin J. Hinich & Michael C. Munger, 1992. "A Spatial Theory of Ideology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 4(1), pages 5-30, January.
    19. Gordon F. Bloom, 1941. "A Reconsideration of the Theory of Exploitation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 55(3), pages 413-442.
    20. Posner, Richard A, 1980. "A Theory of Primitive Society, with Special Reference to Law," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 1-53, April.
    21. Baumol, William J, 1974. "The Transformation of Values: What Marx "Really" Meant: Reply," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 74-75, March.
    22. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1978. "Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 27-43, December.
    23. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    24. Lerner, Abba P, 1972. "A Note on "Understanding the Marxian Notion of Exploitation."," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 50-51, March.
    25. Peter Bloch, 1986. "The politico-economic behavior of authoritarian governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 117-128, January.
    26. Quinn, Joseph F, 1982. "Pension Wealth of Government and Private Sector Workers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 283-287, May.
    27. McChesney, Fred S, 1991. "Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of Regulation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 73-90, January.
    28. Joseph Reid & Michael Kurth, 1988. "Public employees in political firms: Part A. The patronage era," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 253-262, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Elias L. Khalil, 2017. "Exploitation and Efficiency," The Review of Black Political Economy, Springer;National Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 363-377, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    2. William C. Mitchell, 1990. "Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 2(1), pages 85-108, January.
    3. Arye L. Hillman & Heinrich W. Ursprung, 2016. "Where are the rent seekers?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 124-141, June.
    4. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    5. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    6. Stavins, Robert & Keohane, Nathaniel & Revesz, Richard, 1997. "The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy," RFF Working Paper Series dp-97-25, Resources for the Future.
    7. Skully, David W., 1990. "Government Intervention in Agriculture: A Regulatory Approach," Staff Reports 278332, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    8. Frédéric Boehm, 2005. "Corrupción y captura en la regulación de los servicios públicos," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 7(13), pages 245-263, July-Dece.
    9. Schuh, G. Edward, 1981. "Economics And International Relations A Conceptual Framework," 1981 Annual Meeting, July 26-29, Clemson, South Carolina 279342, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    10. Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 371-387, June.
    11. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Eric Langlais & Bruno Lovat & Francesco Parisi, 2007. "Crowding-out in productive and redistributive rent-seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 199-229, October.
    12. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    13. Christian Bjørnskov & Axel Dreher & Justina Fischer, 2008. "Cross-country determinants of life satisfaction: exploring different determinants across groups in society," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 119-173, January.
    14. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    15. Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, "undated". "The Role of Direct Democracy and Federalism in Local Power," IEW - Working Papers 209, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    16. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    17. Randall G. Holcombe, 2020. "Progressive Democracy: the ideology of the modern predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 287-301, March.
    18. Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul & Strunz, Sebastian & Heuson, Clemens, 2018. "Public Choice barriers to efficient climate adaptation – theoretical insights and lessons learned from German flood disasters," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 473-499, June.
    19. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Jay S. Coggins, 1995. "Rent Dissipation And The Social Cost Of Price Policy," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(2), pages 147-166, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:317-348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.