Representing collective reasons for group decisions: The judgment aggregation problem revisited
AbstractThis article argues that the discursive dilemma and the judgement aggregation which causes it are based on a misconception of what it means for a group to give reasons for a democratic decision. Judgement aggregation analyses fail to distinguish between the procedure for determining such a decision, which should involve a vote of all group members, and the process for determining the reasons for such a decision, which should only take account of the views of the members that supported that decision. On the basis of this improved interpretation, the article advances a method for representing reasons for group decisions that is both democratic and rational, thus avoiding the choice between these apparently incompatible goals suggested by the discursive dilemma.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Theoretical Politics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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