A model of non-informational preference change
AbstractAccording to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent's preferences. Any change in these 'motivationally salient' dimensions can change the agent's preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by in its journal Journal of Theoretical Politics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Other versions of this item:
- Dietrich Franz & List Christian, 2009. "A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change," Research Memoranda 015, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
- Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2009. "A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000297, David K. Levine.
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