IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jothpo/v17y2005i3p339-361.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity

Author

Listed:
  • Astrid Lorenz

    (Institute for Social Sciences, Humboldt University of Berlin, astrid.lorenz@sowi.hu-berlin.de)

Abstract

This article deals with the (possible) explanation of constitutional development by the rigidity of the constitution itself, for example the difficulty of the amendment process. Four concepts of measuring rigidity are tested theoretically and their respective outcomes concerning the frequency of constitutional reforms are explained. The strikingly different results show how important it is to discuss and to test operationalizations of abstract terms.

Suggested Citation

  • Astrid Lorenz, 2005. "How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 17(3), pages 339-361, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:3:p:339-361
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629805052883
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0951629805052883
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0951629805052883?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Riker, William H., 1980. "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 432-446, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frimpong Boamah, Emmanuel, 2018. "Constitutional economics of Ghana’s decentralization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 256-267.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kenneth Benoit & John W. Schiemann, 2001. "Institutional Choice in New Democracies," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 13(2), pages 153-182, April.
    2. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    3. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur, 2016. "Formal versus informal legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 1-17.
    4. repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:1039-1089 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Antoaneta Dimitrova & Bernard Steunenberg, 2017. "Pitfalls on the Road to Frey’s Democracy of the Future," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 213-222, November.
    6. William Gehrlein, 2002. "Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: different perspectives on balanced preferences ," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 171-199, March.
    7. Buitrago R., Ricardo E. & Barbosa Camargo, María Inés, 2021. "Institutions, institutional quality, and international competitiveness: Review and examination of future research directions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 423-435.
    8. Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.
    9. Vassilakis, Spyros, 1992. "Some economic applications of Scott domains," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 24(2-3), pages 173-208, November.
    10. Bryan K. Ritchie, 2010. "Systemic Vulnerability and Sustainable Economic Growth," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13731.
    11. C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Meng-Yu Liang, 2022. "Why Are All Communist Countries Dictatorial?," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 22-A002, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    12. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John & Le Breton, Michel, 2002. "Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 88-105, March.
    13. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & François Poinas & Karine Straeten, 2015. "Citizens’ preferences about voting rules: self-interest, ideology, and sincerity," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 423-442, September.
    14. Henry S. Farber, 1984. "The Analysis of Union Behavior," NBER Working Papers 1502, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield & Kevin McAlister & Jee Jeon, 2014. "The variable choice set logit model applied to the 2004 Canadian election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 427-463, March.
    16. Georg Vanberg, 1998. "Abstract Judicial Review, Legislative Bargaining, and Policy Compromise," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 10(3), pages 299-326, July.
    17. Beata Stepien & Monika Sulimowska-Formowicz, 2016. "Economic Vs. Organisational Perspective On Inter-Organisational Relations’ Analysis – Are Economists On The Dead-End Track?," Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, Institute of Economic Research, vol. 11(1), pages 159-177, March.
    18. Tanner, Thomas Cole, 1994. "The spatial theory of elections: an analysis of voters' predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space," ISU General Staff Papers 1994010108000018174, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    19. Bryan D. Jones & Frank R. Baumgartner & Christian Breunig & Christopher Wlezien & Stuart Soroka & Martial Foucault & Abel François & Christoffer Green‐Pedersen & Chris Koski & Peter John & Peter B. Mo, 2009. "A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets: A Comparative Analysis," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(4), pages 855-873, October.
    20. Kathleen Bawn & Gregory Koger, 2008. "Effort, Intensity and Position Taking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 20(1), pages 67-92, January.
    21. Dan Usher, 2014. "An alternative explanation of the chance of casting a pivotal vote," Rationality and Society, , vol. 26(1), pages 105-138, February.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:17:y:2005:i:3:p:339-361. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.