Inducing Cooperative Behavior among Proselfs versus Prosocials: The Moderating Role of Incentives and Trust
AbstractThis study investigates how an individual's social value orientation (SVO) interacts with explicit cooperative incentives on one hand, and intrinsic and extraneously induced trust on the other hand, to affect cooperative behavior. In three experiments, subjects (n = 322) played a one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD; with weak cooperative incentives) and an assurance game (AG; with strong cooperative incentives) in conditions with or without trust signals. The authors found, as expected, that cooperative behavior is strongly spurred by explicit incentives, but not by trust, among people with a proself value orientation. Conversely, trust is very important to enhance cooperative behavior of participants with a prosocial value orientation, whereas explicit incentives are less important compared to proselfs. The authors conclude that this study reveals two fundamentally different logics of cooperative behavior: one based on extrinsic incentives and the other on trust.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Journal of Conflict Resolution.
Volume (Year): 54 (2010)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/
cooperation; social dilemma; social value orientation; trust; game theory;
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- Kurt A. Ackermann & Jürgen Fleiß & Ryan O. Murphy, 2013. "Reciprocity as an individual difference," Working Paper Series, Social and Economic Sciences 2013-05, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz.
- DECLERCK, Carolyn H. & BOONE, Christophe & KIYONARI, Toko, 2011. "No place to hide: When shame causes proselfs to cooperate," Working Papers 2011018, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics.
- Christoph Engel & Lilia Zhurakhovska, 2012. "When is the Risk of Cooperation Worth Taking? The Prisoner’s Dilemma as a Game of Multiple Motives," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2012_16, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, revised Aug 2013.
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