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Asymmetric Conflict

Author

Listed:
  • Derek J. Clark

    (Department of Economics and Management University of Tromsø, Norway)

  • Kai A. Konrad

    (Social Science Research Center Berlin and Free University of Berlin, Germany)

Abstract

The authors study conflict on multiple fronts. A defending player needs to successfully defend all fronts, and an attacker needs to win at only one. Multiple fronts result in a considerable disadvantage for the defending player, and even if there is a defense advantage at each of them, the payoff of the defending player is zero if the number of fronts is large. With some positive probability, in the equilibrium defending players surrender without expending effort.

Suggested Citation

  • Derek J. Clark & Kai A. Konrad, 2007. "Asymmetric Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 51(3), pages 457-469, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:51:y:2007:i:3:p:457-469
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002707300320
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2012. "Strategic Defense And Attack For Series And Parallel Reliability Systems: Rejoinder," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(5), pages 521-524, October.
    2. Gross, Jörg & De Dreu, Carsten K.W. & Reddmann, Lennart, 2022. "Shadow of conflict: How past conflict influences group cooperation and the use of punishment," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    3. Daniel G. Arce & Dan Kovenock J. & Brian Roberson, 2009. "Suicide Terrorism and the Weakest Link," CESifo Working Paper Series 2753, CESifo.

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