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Bargaining, War, and Alliances

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  • R. Harrison Wagner

    (Department of Government University of Texas Austin, Texas, USA, rhwagner@mail.utexas.edu)

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    Abstract

    As a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called “balancing†occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is therefore not necessarily inconsistent with what is called “bandwagoning,†but can actually make bandwagoning more likely. Moreover, balancing need not occur for international systems to be stable.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Conflict Management and Peace Science.

    Volume (Year): 21 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 3 (July)
    Pages: 215-231

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    Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:21:y:2004:i:3:p:215-231

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    Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/

    Related research

    Keywords: bargaining; war; alliances; balance of power; balancing; bandwagoning;

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    Cited by:
    1. L. Lambertini, 2006. "Is America Unrivaled? A Repeated Game Analysis," Working Papers 563, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    2. Konrad, Kai A. & Cusack, Thomas R., 2013. "Hanging Together or Being Hung Separately: The Strategic Power of Coalitions where Bargaining Occurs with Incomplete Information," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79967, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

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