Bargaining, War, and Alliances
AbstractAs a way of clarifying and evaluating competing claims made by writers on alliances and the balance of power, I extend recent work on the relation between bargaining and war to a three-state setting where coalitions are possible. I show that if what is commonly called â€œbalancingâ€ occurs at all, it is because it is seen as a way of reducing the risk associated with possible exogenous changes in the distribution of military capabilities. It is therefore not necessarily inconsistent with what is called â€œbandwagoning,â€ but can actually make bandwagoning more likely. Moreover, balancing need not occur for international systems to be stable.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Peace Science Society (International) in its journal Conflict Management and Peace Science.
Volume (Year): 21 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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Web page: http://pss.la.psu.edu/
bargaining; war; alliances; balance of power; balancing; bandwagoning;
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Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order
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