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Geplante Steuerhinterziehung und ihre effiziente Bestrafung

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  • Wolfram F. Richter

Abstract

Ausgangspunkt der modelltheoretischen Betrachtungen war in Abschnitt 2.1 die Feststellung, dass die herkömmliche Strafbemessung in weiten Bereichen kühl kalkulierende Steuerhinterzieher von ihrem Tun nicht abbringen wird. Die herkömmliche Strafbemessung folgt dem Gedanken der Bestrafung nach Leistungsfähigkeit und verfehlt insbesondere im unteren Bereich relativer Hinterziehungsbeträge jede abschreckende Wirkung. Ökonomisch ist das kritikwürdig. Ökonomisch sollte die Bestrafungspolitik einer anreizverträglichen und effizienten öffentlichen Einnahmenerzielung dienen. Das bedeutet insbesondere, dass sich Steuerhinterziehung nicht rechnen darf. Die Abschnitte 2.2 bis 2.5 gehen der Frage nach, welche Eigenschaften eine ökonomisch effiziente Bestrafung auszeichnen. Steuerehrlichkeit kann grundsätzlich durch verstärkte Prüftätigkeit erzwungen werden. Eine begrenzte Ausweitung der Prüftätigkeit dürfte sich für den Staat sogar netto rechnen (Küster 1983: 258). Eine Ausweitung bis zu dem Punkt, bei dem Steuerhinterziehung unattraktiv wird, ist dagegen kostspielig. Insofern ist es eine interessante Überlegung, die Anreize für steuerehrliches Verhalten zu erhöhen, ohne die Häufigkeit von Prüfungen steigern zu müssen. Becker (1968) offeriert eine triviale aber inakzeptable Lösung, die im Abschnitt 2.2 diskutiert wird - man muss lediglich die Strafe bei aufgedeckter Hinterziehung abschreckend hoch setzen..[...]

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung in its journal RWI Materialien.

Volume (Year): (2007)
Issue (Month): (08)
Pages: 31

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Handle: RePEc:rwi:materi:037

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  1. Wolfram F. Richter & Robin W. Boadway, 2005. "Trading Off Tax Distortion and Tax Evasion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(3), pages 361-381, 08.
  2. Sheffrin, S.M. & Triest, R.K., 1991. "Can Brute Deterrence Backfire? Perceptions and Attitudes in Taxpayer Compliance," Papers, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs 373, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
  3. Fullerton, Don & Karayannis, Marios, 1994. "Tax evasion and the allocation of capital," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 257-278, October.
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  5. Sanjit Dhami & Ali al-Nowaihi, 2003. "Why Do People Pay Taxes? An Explanation Based On Loss Aversion And Overweighting of Low Probabilities," Discussion Papers in Economics, Department of Economics, University of Leicester 03/18, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  6. Robin Boadway & Motohiro Sato, 2000. "The Optimality of Punishing Only the Innocent: The Case of Tax Evasion," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(6), pages 641-664, December.
  7. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Sharmila King & Steven Sheffrin, 2002. "Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative Approach," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 505-521, August.
  9. Michele Bernasconi & Alberto Zanardi, 2004. "Tax Evasion, Tax Rates, and Reference Dependence," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 60(3), pages 422-, September.
  10. Beckmann, Klaus, 2003. "Steuerhinterziehung," Beiträge zur Finanzwissenschaft, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, edition 1, volume 18, number urn:isbn:9783161481819, July.
  11. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2007. "Direkte Demokratie, Steuermoral und Steuerhinterziehung: Erfahrungen aus der Schweiz," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8(1), pages 38-64, 01.

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