Green Taxes in a Federal Context: An Empirical Model for Industrial Waste in Spain
AbstractThis paper reveals that the design of the green taxes levied on the production of industrial waste by certain regional governments in Spain does not appear to reduce environmental damage. This may be because these taxes try to mitigate financial shorts, tax rates are too low and are fixed arbitrarily, and agents react to tax differentials across regions by disposing of their waste in regions with lower or null tax rates or illegally dumping it. This suggests that the environmental issues related to the disposal of industrial waste should be supervised by the national government or somehow coordinated across regions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Southern Regional Science Association in its journal Review of Regional Studies.
Volume (Year): 40 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
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