Public utilities have recently undergone a major process of reorganization. Competitive segments have been liberalized, (eventually) privatised and tend to evolve into partially regulated oligopo-lies. In the latter, former monopolists are subject to regulatory duties whereas competitors operate unregulated, although endowed with market power. Having these scenarios in mind, we propose a mechanism of partial regulation that is suitable for private Cournot oligopolies. Iterated over time, this scheme, which relies upon data about current costs and past performance, converges to the equilibrium of a Nash-Cournot mixed oligopoly.
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Volume (Year): 97 (2007) Issue (Month): 4 (July-August) Pages: 79-114 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:rpo:ripoec:v:97:y:2007:i:4:p:79-114
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