Efficiency Incentives for a Regulated Monopoly: Some Lessons from the English and Welsh Water Industry
AbstractIn this study we analyze the evolution of operating cost efficiency for the English and Welsh water industry over the period 1995-2001 by estimating an heteroskedastic stochastic variable cost frontier. Aim of the paper is to analyze cost efficiency over a period characterized by significant changes in regulatory framework. The main results of this paper are that industry operating cost efficiency has improved and efficiency differentials among firms have steadily narrowed. We argue that this pattern of efficiency has been generated by the incentives provided by comparative and capital market competition which became fully operative after the 1994 price review.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.
Volume (Year): 97 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 (July-August)
Contact details of provider:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L95 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Gas Utilities; Pipelines; Water Utilities
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabrina Marino).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.