Combinatorial Procurement Auctions: A Collusion Remedy?
AbstractThis paper presents the outcome of an experiment where the standard one shot sealed bid procurement auction for two identical goods provides the benchmark. Inducing scale economies a combinatorial auction is applied on the situation with non-linear costs. The mechanisms are first run without, and then with the possibility for subjects to communicate prior to bidding. There are two human and one computer bidder in each period. It is demonstrated that the combinatorial mechanism is able to enhance efficiency and that subjects are less inclined to cooperate under the combinatorial auction than under the standard bidding format.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.
Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January-February)
Contact details of provider:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sabrina Marino).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.