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Subnational Budget Rules: Foreign and Russian Experience
[Субнациональные Бюджетные Правила: Зарубежный И Российский Опыт]

Author

Listed:
  • Kudrin, Alexey L. (Кудрин, Алексей)

    (St. Petersburg State University, Council of the Center for Strategic Research)

  • Deryugin, Alexander N. (Дерюгин, Александр)

    (Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration)

Abstract

The article discusses the rules and restrictions for subnational budgets in Russia and some federative countries, as well as the current level of debt burden of the respective public authority. According to the authors, in the world practice, modern budget rules for the regions are characterized by flexible built-in mechanisms that allow them to adapt quickly to external and internal shocks without making changes in their basic design. This ensures not only fiscal sustainability of public finances at the regional level, but also stability of budget legislation and its law enforcement practice. The authors analyze the arguments pro and contra the application of conditional budget rules, that is, the features of binding certain restrictions of budget parameters (volume of expenditures, regional budget deficit, public debt) to such criteria as the level of transfer dependence, the amount of accumulated debt level, the dynamics of GRP growth rates etc. The analysis of international and Russian practice has led to the conclusion that budgetary rules should not be differentiated based on the level of transfer dependence, that there is a need for tighter restrictions for regions with high debt burden, and that budget rules should be given sufficient flexibility. In order to ensure effective application of new budget rules, the authors propose limiting the practice of making decisions at the federal level that directly affect the expenditure obligations of the regions, and introducing a system of built-in mechanisms to increase fiscal discipline, including encouraging regions that implement responsible fiscal policies and applying sanctions for violating budget rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Kudrin, Alexey L. (Кудрин, Алексей) & Deryugin, Alexander N. (Дерюгин, Александр), 2018. "Subnational Budget Rules: Foreign and Russian Experience [Субнациональные Бюджетные Правила: Зарубежный И Российский Опыт]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 8-35, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1801
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Douglas Sutherland & Robert Price & Isabelle Joumard, 2005. "Fiscal Rules for Sub-central Governments: Design and Impact," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 465, OECD Publishing.
    2. Alberto F. Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1999. "Budget Deficits and Budget Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 13-36, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo Group Munich.
    4. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses - The Swiss Experience," CESifo Working Paper Series 4195, CESifo.
    5. Mrs. Nina Budina & Ms. Andrea Schaechter & Miss Anke Weber & Mr. Tidiane Kinda, 2012. "Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis: Toward the "Next-Generation" Rules: A New Dataset," IMF Working Papers 2012/187, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vladislav V. Bukharsky, 2021. "Fiscal Decentralization and Incentives of Local Authorities in the Russian Federation," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 2, pages 114-129, April.
    2. Oleg V. Buklemishev & Denis L. Mikhaylov & Vladimir V. Solovyev & Igor G. Fetisov, 2018. "Effectiveness of Legislative Restrictions on Debt Burden of the Russian Regions," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 3, pages 34-48, June.
    3. Alexander D. Andryakov & Evgeniy A. Dombrovskiy, 2020. "Fiscal Measures to Boost the Economic Development of Russian Territories," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 5, pages 99-113, October.
    4. Igor Yu. Arlashkin, 2021. "Clustering of Russian Regions by Level of Debt Sustainability," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 5, pages 108-124, October.
    5. Evgeny N. Timushev & Vita A. Yagovkina, 2023. "Reserve Funds in Russian Regions: Factors of Formation and Efficiency Assessment," Finansovyj žhurnal — Financial Journal, Financial Research Institute, Moscow 125375, Russia, issue 5, pages 61-78, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    budget rules; budget balance; regional budgets; public debt; deficit; transfer dependency.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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