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Price Controls in the Postal Sector: A Welfare Analysis of Alternative Control Structures

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Author Info
Phillippe De Donder () (Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and GREMAQ))
Helmuth Cremer (Toulouse School of Economics (IDEI and GREMAQ))
Paul Dudley (Royal Mail Group)
Frank Rodriguez (Royal Mail Group)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Postal regulators set price controls in order to simultaneously ensure the provision of the universal service, promote competition and equity. We study the associated price control procedures in a model where the universal service provider offers both a single piece product and a business mail product and where entrants offer a bulk mail product. Our results from the numerical calibration of our model indicate that in the case where entry is confined only to access, a range of procedures appear capable of meeting these objectives. However, if bypass is available these trade offs become more costly.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Concept Economics in its journal Review of Network Economics.

Volume (Year): 7 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 247-271
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rne:rneart:v:7:y:2008:i:2:p:247-271

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Related research
Keywords: price cap ; universal service obligations; access; bypass;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Creating Competition through Interconnection: Theory and Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 227-56, November.
  2. Philippe Donder, 2006. "Access Pricing in the Postal Sector: Theory and Simulations," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 307-326, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Armstrong, Mark, 2001. "The theory of access pricing and interconnection," MPRA Paper 15608, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Billette de Villemeur, Etienne, et al, 2003. "Optimal Pricing and Price-Cap Regulation in the Postal Sector," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 49-62, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mark Armstrong, 2008. "Access Pricing, Bypass and Universal Service in Post," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 7(2), pages 172-187, June. [Downloadable!]
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