Francis Bloch (GREQAM, Université de la Méditerranée and Warwick University) Axel Gautier () (HEC, Université de Liège and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain)
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In a fully liberalized postal market, two business models will be possible for a new postal operator: (1) access: where the firm performs the upstream operations and uses the incumbent's network for final delivery and (2) bypass where the competing firm controls the entire supply chain and delivers mails with its own network. The choice between access and bypass depends on the entrant's delivery cost relative to the access price. In this paper, we derive welfare maximizing prices for the incumbent operator and we show how these prices should be re-balanced when the entry method is considered as endogenous.
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Francis Bloch & Axel Gautier, 2006.
"Access Pricing and Entry in the Postal Sector,"
CREPP Working Papers
0606, Centre de Recherche en Economie Publique et de la Population (CREPP) (Research Center on Public and Population Economics) HEC-Management School, University of Liège.
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1994.
"Access Pricing and Competition,"
Working papers
94-31, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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