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Regulating Vertical Integration in Broadband: Open Access versus Common Carriage

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Author Info
Christiaan Hogendorn () (Economics Department, Wesleyan University)

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Abstract

Broadband Internet involves two vertical relationships: the Internet Service Provider (ISP) requires both a physical conduit (e.g. telephone or cable television lines) and content. The ISP–conduit relationship has been subject to controversial unbundling regulation, but no such rules apply to the ISP–content relationship. We argue that regardless of whether ISPs are vertically integrated with conduits, they have incentives to create vertical restrictions on content. Foreclosure of ISPs by conduits may not increase and indeed could reduce these restrictions. Thus, telephone common carriage and Internet application neutrality may both be at odds with unbundling and “open access” policies.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Concept Economics in its journal Review of Network Economics.

Volume (Year): 4 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 19-32
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:rne:rneart:v:4:y:2005:i:1:p:19-32

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Web page: http://www.rnejournal.com

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Related research
Keywords: vertical integration; ISP; open access; regulation; foreclosure;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, 1986. "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 48-58, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Christiaan Hogendorn, 2004. "Broadband Internet: Open Access and Content Competition," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2004-002, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Robert W. Crandall & Allan T. Ingraham & Hal J. Singer, 2004. "Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 0(1). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.


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