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Approaches to Regulating Interchange Fees in Payment Systems

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Author Info
Joshua S. Gans () (Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne)
Stephen P. King (Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne)

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Abstract

Significant attention worldwide has been paid to the regulation of credit card interchange fees. In part, this attention has followed concerns expressed about the level of these fees in Europe, the U.S. and Australia. The Reserve Bank of Australia recently conducted an extensive inquiry into the interchange fees associated with credit cards and has moved to regulate those fees. At the same time, research economists have considered determinants of the socially optimal interchange fee. In this paper, we use the Australian experience to highlight alternative methods of regulating interchange fees in payments systems. We use a simple model to derive a socially optimal interchange fee when merchants cannot freely set different prices for different payment instruments. We compare the socially optimal interchange fee from this model with those presented in the economics literature and show that most analyses capture a simple externality within the optimal fee. Credit card usage for a specific transaction is determined by the customer. But the customer does not bear the costs or receive the benefits that card usage imposes on the merchant. The optimal interchange fee internalises this externality. We then compare the theoretical optimal interchange fee with the approaches proposed in Australia, and show that the regulatory approach adopted by the Reserve Bank of Australia may be viewed as economically conservative in certain situations. Finally, we consider additional issues that will impinge on the regulation of interchange fees.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Concept Economics in its journal Review of Network Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 125-145
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Handle: RePEc:rne:rneart:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:125-145

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Related research
Keywords: payment systems interchange fees regulation banks Reserve Bank of Australia

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Joshua Gans & Stephen King, 2003. "The Neutrality of Interchange Fees in Payment Systems," Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1069-1069. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Sujit Chakravorti & William R. Emmons, 2001. "Who pays for credit cards?," Occasional Paper; Emerging Payments EPS-2001-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  3. Graeme Guthrie & Julian Wright, 2003. "Competing Payment Schemes," Departmental Working Papers wp0311, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Baxter, William F, 1983. "Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and Economic Perspectives," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(3), pages 541-88, October.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. José L. Negrín, 2005. "The Regulation of Payment Cards: The Mexican Experience," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 4(4), pages 243-265, December. [Downloadable!]
  2. Robert M. Hunt, 2003. "An introduction to the economics of payment card networks," Working Papers 03-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Margaret E. Guerin-Calvert & Janusz A. Ordover, 2005. "Merchant Benefits and Public Policy towards Interchange: An Economic Assessment," Review of Network Economics, Concept Economics, vol. 4(4), pages 384-414, December. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nicholas Economides, 2007. "Nonbanks in the Payments System: Vertical Integration Issues," Working Papers 07-06, NET Institute, revised Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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