Statistical Science and Philosophy of Science Part 2: Shallow versus Deep Explorations
AbstractInability to clearly defend against the criticisms of frequentist methods has turned many a frequentist away from venturing into foundational battlegrounds. Conceding the distorted perspectives drawn from overly literal and radical expositions of what Fisher, Neyman, and Pearson ‘really thought’, some deny they matter to current practice. The goal of this paper is not merely to call attention to the howlers that pass as legitimate criticisms of frequentist error statistics, but also to sketch the main lines of an alternative statistical philosophy within which to better articulate the roles and value of frequentist tools.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management in its journal Rationality, Markets and Morals.
Volume (Year): 3 (2012)
Issue (Month): 56 (September)
philosophy of science; philosophy of statistics; decision theory; likelihood; subjective probability; Bayesianism; Bayes theorem; Fisher; Neyman and Pearson; Jeffreys; induction; frequentism; reliability; informativeness;
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- Spanos,Aris, 1999. "Probability Theory and Statistical Inference," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521424080.
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