Conspiraces and Secret Price Discounts in the Marketplace: Evidence from Field Experiments
AbstractWe explore collusion by using the tools of experimental economics in a naturally occurring marketplace. We report that competitive price theory adequately organizes data in multilateral decentralized bargaining markets without conspiratorial opportunities. When conspiratorial opportunities are allowed and contract prices are perfectly observed, prices (quantities) are considerably above (below) competitive levels. When sellers receive imperfect price signals, outcomes are intermediate to those of competitive markets and collusive markets with full information. Finally, experienced buyers serve as a catalyst to thwart attempts by sellers to engage in anticompetitive pricing: in periods where experienced agents transact in the market, average transaction prices are below those realized in periods where only inexperienced agents execute trades.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 36 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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Web page: http://www.rje.org
Other versions of this item:
- John List & Michael Price, 2005. "Conspiracies and secret price discounts in the marketplace: Evidence from field experiments," Framed Field Experiments 00115, The Field Experiments Website.
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- John List, 2013. "Using field experiments to change the template of how we teach economics," Artefactual Field Experiments 00389, The Field Experiments Website.
- Omar Al-Ubaydli & Peter Boettke, 2012.
"Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the 'hayek hypothesis',"
Framed Field Experiments
00195, The Field Experiments Website.
- Omar Al-Ubaydli & Peter Boettke, 2011. "Markets as Economizers of Information: Field Experimental Examination of the "Hayek Hypothesis"," Working Papers 1025, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Al-Ubaydli, Omar & Boettke, Peter, 2010. "Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental examination of the “Hayek Hypothesis”," MPRA Paper 27660, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jonathan E. Alevy & Michael K. Price, 2012. "Advice and Fictive Learning: The Pricing of Assets in the Laboratory," Working Papers 2012-07, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
- Levitt, Steven D. & List, John A., 2009.
"Field experiments in economics: The past, the present, and the future,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Steven Levitt & John List, 2009. "Field experiments in economics: The past, the present, and the future," Artefactual Field Experiments 00079, The Field Experiments Website.
- Steven D. Levitt & John A. List, 2008. "Field Experiments in Economics: The Past, The Present, and The Future," NBER Working Papers 14356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffery Flory & Uri Gneezy & Kenneth Leonard & John List, 2012. "Sex, competitiveness, and investment in offspring: On the origin of preferences," Artefactual Field Experiments 00072, The Field Experiments Website.
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