Forward Markets and Signals of Quality
AbstractWe analyze how information about quality may be conveyed via forward trading. A privately informed monopolist has the opportunity to make forward sales. Speculators and consumers, participating in the forward and the spot markets respectively, observe the monopolist's decisions in these markets. We show that forward trading may emerge in equilibrium although the monopolist has neither insurance nor hedging incentives. Indeed, the high-quality monopolist uses forward trading to reduce the cost of signalling quality through spot prices. We conclude that forward trading indirectly contributes to signal quality more efficiently in the spot market. Copyright 2003 by the RAND Corporation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 34 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
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- Manfredo, Mark R. & Sanders, Dwight R., 2008. "Price discovery in a private cash forward market for lumber," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 73-89, January.
- Dubois, P. & Nauges, C., 2006.
"Identifying the effect of unobserved quality and experts' reviews in the pricing of experience goods : empirical application on Bordeaux wine,"
Economics Working Paper Archive (Toulouse)
200607, French Institute for Agronomy Research (INRA), Economics Laboratory in Toulouse (ESR Toulouse).
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- Dubois, Pierre & Nauges, Céline, 2006. "Identifying the Effect of Unobserved Quality and Experts' Reviews in the Pricing of Experience Goods: Empirical Application on Bordeaux Wine," IDEI Working Papers 395, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Dubois, Pierre & Nauges, Celine, 2007. "Identifying the Effect of Unobserved Quality and Expert Reviews in the Pricing of Experience Goods: Empirical Application on Bordeaux Wine," Working Papers 37320, American Association of Wine Economists.
- Mahenc, P. & Salanie, F., 2004. "Softening competition through forward trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 282-293, June.
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