Durable-Goods Monopoly with Stochastic Values

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Durable-Goods Monopoly with Stochastic Values

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Biehl, Andrew R

Abstract

I analyze a durable-goods model that allows consumers' values to vary over time. The optimal mechanism for a monopolist is computed and compared to both the sales and leasing equilibria. I show that sales may implement the optimal strategy, and that the dominance of leasing over sales is not necessarily true. This implication is consistent with the prevalence of simple sales contracts in many markets. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.

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Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (Autumn)
Pages: 565-77
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:32:y:2001:i:3:p:565-77

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Marco Battaglini, 2003. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000048, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Marco Battaglini, 2005. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 637-658, June. [Downloadable!]
Pasquale Schiraldi, 2006. "Second-Hand Markets and Collusion by Manufacturers of Semidurable Goods," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-028, Boston University - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Battaglini, Marco, 2005. "Optimality and Renegotiation in Dynamic Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 5014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Battaglini, Marco, 2007. "Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 213-246, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2006. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 756-784, June. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- David P. Myatt & Justin P. Johnson, 2004. "On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design," Economics Series Working Papers 185, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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