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Durable-Goods Monopoly: Laboratory Market and Bargaining Experiments

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  • Stanley S. Reynolds

Abstract

Results from single-period monopoly experiments (nondurable environment) are compared with results from multiperiod experiments that have features of a durable-goods environment. Average prices were below the static monopoly benchmark price in all settings. Observed initial prices were higher in multiperiod experiments than in single-period experiments, in contrast to equilibrium predictions. Prices in multiperiod experiments tended to fall over time; there was less price cutting in market experiments than in bargaining experiments. There was substantial demand withholding by buyers in multiperiod experiments. A version of bounded rationality is a promising candidate for explaining deviations from equilibrium predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Stanley S. Reynolds, 2000. "Durable-Goods Monopoly: Laboratory Market and Bargaining Experiments," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 375-394, Summer.
  • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:31:y:2000:i:summer:p:375-394
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    Cited by:

    1. van Damme, E.E.C. & Larouche, P. & Müller, W., 2006. "Abuse of a Dominant Position : Cases and Experiments," Discussion Paper 2006-020, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
    2. Vincent Mak & Amnon Rapoport & Eyran J. Gisches & Jiaojie Han, 2014. "Purchasing Scarce Products Under Dynamic Pricing: An Experimental Investigation," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 16(3), pages 425-438, July.
    3. Bayer, Ralph-C., 2010. "Intertemporal price discrimination and competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 273-293, February.
    4. Mohammed Al-Hitmi & Salman Ahmad & Atif Iqbal & Sanjeevikumar Padmanaban & Imtiaz Ashraf, 2018. "Selective Harmonic Elimination in a Wide Modulation Range Using Modified Newton–Raphson and Pattern Generation Methods for a Multilevel Inverter," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-16, February.
    5. Heinrich Ursprung & Katarina Zigova, 2021. "The Ultimate Coasian Commitment: Estimating and Explaining Artist-Specific Death Effects," Working Papers CEB 21-013, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Vincent Mak & Amnon Rapoport & Eyran J. Gisches, 2018. "Dynamic Pricing Decisions and Seller-Buyer Interactions under Capacity Constraints," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(1), pages 1-23, February.
    7. Beckman & Gregory DeAngelo & Smith, 2015. "Dictator monopolies and essential goods: experimental evidence," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(59), pages 6461-6478, December.
    8. Atasoy, Ayse Tugba & Harmsen-van Hout, Marjolein & Madlener, Reinhard, 2018. "Strategic Demand Response to Dynamic Pricing: A Lab Experiment for the Electricity Market," FCN Working Papers 5/2018, E.ON Energy Research Center, Future Energy Consumer Needs and Behavior (FCN), revised Jan 2020.
    9. Le Coq, Chloe & Orzen, Henrik, 2006. "Do forward markets enhance competition?: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 415-431, November.
    10. Reynolds, Stanley S., 2001. "Multi-period bargaining: asymmetric information and risk aversion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 309-315, September.
    11. Nur Ayvaz‐Çavdaroğlu & Mürüvvet Büyükboyacı, 2022. "Analyzing multiple pricing decisions for substitutes under stochastic demand: An experiment," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(5), pages 1351-1361, July.
    12. Rosato, Antonio, 2017. "Sequential negotiations with loss-averse buyers," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 290-304.
    13. Jack Fanning & Andrew Kloosterman, 2022. "An experimental test of the Coase conjecture: Fairness in dynamic bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(1), pages 138-165, March.
    14. Fanning, Jack, 2022. "Fairness and the Coase conjecture," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).

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